TOM HERMAN 707-2670

CMH NEWSLETTER

THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE COLORADO MILITARY HISTORIANS

VOLUME 1, NUMBER 10 JULY, 1967

LIEUTENANT ADAM J. SLEMMER

COMMANDER OF FORT PICKENS

FORT PICKENS

by

DAN JONES

During the early and mid-1800's, the U.S. government with the consent and cooperation of thevarious states, established many forts and defensive works in the southern states and along their coastlines. With the secessionist movement, a movement started originally as a political bluff but which soon reached beyond the control of its creators, the southern states wishing to establish their ownsovereignty, began to seize and claimas their own all federal works within the boundaries of their respective states. By late 1860, from Charleston to the Rio Grande, one by one, the fortifications quietly passed into state control. However, the Federal government still controlled and garrisoned four forts. These were Fort Sumterin Charleston Harbor, Fort Taylor at Key West, Florida, Fort Jefferson,offshore in the Dry Tortugas, and Fort Pickens in Pensacola Bay. Forts Jefferson and Taylor, although important from a Union viewpoint, were of no concern to the southerners because of their remote locations. However, Fort Sumter and the secondary forts in Charleston Harbor played a prominent part in early disagreements between the north and south. These forts were more of a symbol than an actual threat, as they were for the most part, either incomplete or obsolete. To such states as South Carolina, which wished to be a nation rather thanaa state, the forts were symbols of a hostile government which dared to intervene in local affairs. With the bombardment of Sumter on the morning of April 12, 1861, a year of perennial crises and tension in Charleston reached its climax, thus beginning four years of the most terrible kind of war——countryman against countryman.

As the federal government watched the secessionist movement grow in strength and saw its forts seized by state militia, it was forced to make a decision. Of the four remaining only two were threatened. These were the forts in Charleston and Pensacola. As the situation existed at that time, the states of Florida and South Carolina had agreed not to attackthese forts, provided the government made no attempts to reinforce them with either materials or additional troops. In the event such a move became necessary, the government pledged to notify the states in advance. The federal government then faced the choice of turning over their last remaining defensive works in what was rapidly becoming a hostile south or attempting to reinforce them, thus risking war. It was a period of confusion and indecisiveness within the federal government, aggravated by a changing administration. Finally, far too late from a military viewpoint, the decision was made to reinforce both forts. Reinforcements did not arrive in Fort Sumter in time, as Confederate troops opened fire on the fort and closed the harbor to the federal ships. The expidition to Charleston was turned back, but at Pensacola the federal government had a chance to regain what it had lost at Charleston.

The harbor at Pensacola was probably the largest and finest on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The government therefore had selected it as its principal southern naval base, establishing a naval yard, an arsenal, and a marine hospital, and had built several fortifications for its defense. There were three forts in Pensacola Bay; they were Fort McRae Fort Barancas, and Fort Pickens. Potentially, the situation at Pensacola was as explosive as that at Sumter. Only a small garrison was maintained under the command of a middle-aged lieutenant of artillery named Adam J. Slemmer at Fort Barancas. Fort McRae was unoccupied and used only for ammunition storage. The naval yard was indefensible, having only a two feet high brick wall on all sides. In the bay, roughly 3000 yards from any point on the shore, stood Fort Pickens, on the western point of a forty mile long strip of sandknown as Santa Rosa Island. This fort, like Fort McRae, was without a garrison, but to Slemmer it was the most important fort of all as it commanded the entire harbor.

Slemmer was an officer with great faith in the Union but with very little power. His entire force consisted of a single company of forty-six men. For weeks he had been bothered by rumors. He repeatedly heard on all sides that citizens of Florida would soon take possession of all federal property in the harbor. Slemmer was a man of great principle; dignified, and with the intelligence and capabilities of a great soldier. His appearance belied his military abilities. He wore narrow-rimmed glasses, had a full beard and mustache, and had the overall appearance of a mild-mannered schoolteacher or parson. Upon hearing that southerners had seized the forts in Mobile Bay, he summoned his

three officers and went to see the commandant of the naval yard. Commodore James Armstrong was as aged veteran with a distinguished career serving out his last days before retirement. He was known to be heavily influenced by an assistant, Commander Ebenezer Farrand, known to be a secessionist. Slemmer wished to consult the commodore about possible defensive preparations. He received a cold reception. Armstrong stated he had had no instructions from Washington.

The next morning on his own initiative, Slemmer removed the powder from its exposed positions at Fort Barancas and placed it in the inner magazines. He then put all batteries in working order, and that evening placed guards on duty. His precautions were justified, for during the night, an estimated twenty men, apparently thinking the fort unoccupied as usual, came with the apparent intention of taking possession of it. The guards challenged them, and, receiving no answer, fired. The men then retreated, and Slemmer ordered half the garrison to stand watch until dawn.

With daybreak came a letter from Washington. Slemmer's orders: prevent the seizure of the forts in Pensacola Bay. Commodore Armstrong received orders to cooperate with Slemmer, who wasted no time in visiting him. They agreed that in view of Slemmer's small forcethey could hold but one fort, and that this should be Pickens. Commodore Armstrong agreed to send the warship Wyandot, berthed at ath naval yard, and the store ship Supply to assist Slemmer in his evacuation to Pickens and to stand by the fort, offering additional protectionto the garrison. Slemmer got busy after leaving the commodore, and by 10:00 A.M. with part of his command was mounting guns and making other preparations for the defense of Pickens. He left Lt. Gilmer, his second-in-command, at Barancas in charge of the evacuation of theafort. Time passed, but the Wyandot did not appear. Gilman then went to see the commodore and was told the only assistance he could give would be to transport the command th Pickens and furnish some provisions. Obviously the influence of Farrand was very strong on the aged officer. When Slemmer was informed of the situation, he immediately quit work. In a heated arguement, Slemmer charged Armstrong with deception and bad faith, and asked how he was supposed to hold a fort that demanded a garrison of 1200 with only 46 men without the aid of these two ships. In the end, the commodore relented and gave instructions for carrying out the original plan. It was agreed that the Wyandot would be ready at 5:00, but by nightfall there was still no sign of her. The powder from Fort Barancas was transferred to Fort Pickens and under Slemmers orders, the guns at Barancas were spiked, since he had neither the time nor the means to dismount them. Slemmer and his men labored until midnight, then went to bed. A heavy fog shrouded the bay. About 8:00 that evening, several pistol shots were heard, which caused some concern to Slemmer, because the fog obscured their source.

To Lt. Henry Erben, aboard the supply, the shots were no mystery. Unknown to Slemmer, Erben, with his captains permission, led a small crew to Fort McRae to destroy stores of ammunition before they fell into the hands of the state militia. An alarm was sounded, but before any opposition arrived, the men had completed their task. The shots were fired harmlessly across the water into the fog as Erbrn and his men rowed back to their ship. Erben, flushed with his success, requested Armstrong's permission to destroy war material in the naval yard. The commodore refused permission. Farrand was also present, and a violent arguement ensued. Farrand demanded that Erben be put under arrest and sent back to his ship. Armstrong refused, and there the matter stood. The naval yard remained intact. The next day, January 12, Slemmer completed transferring his men and equipment to Fort Pickens. On January 12, Slemmer was informed that the Supply and Wyandot had been ordered elsewhere. He at once protested to Armstrong that he would not attempt to hold Fort Pickens under these conditions, and would notify Washington accordingly. Armstrong replied he was ordered to send the Wyandot to Cuba and the Supply to Vera Cruz and could not deviate from those orders. However both ships remained at the fort. Captain Berryman of the Wyandot, at some risk, obtained muskets for his men from the naval yard. He then placed thirty men under Slemmer's command. The same morning, representatives of the governor of Florida commanded by Col. Lennox demanded the surrender of the naval yard to state authoritie

Slemmer learned from the captain of the Supply that the yard was beseiged. Slemmer immediately requested that the marines stationed in the yard be sent to strenghthen the garrison at Fort Pickens. He received no reply, and a few hours later saw the flag lowered at the naval yard. The steamer Wyandot, towing the Supply, ran out of the yard and anchored near the fort. Slemmer was now left to his own resources with 54 guns ready for service, 81 men including officers, and five months of provisions. In late afternoon of the same day, a formal demand was made by a major, captain, and lieutenant in military dress representing the state of Florida for the surrender of the fort. Upon being refused admittance to the fort the representatives demanded to speak to the commanding officer. Slemmer went out to talk. The Captain announced,"We have been sent by the governors of Alabama and Florida to demand a peaceful surrender of this fort."

Lt. Slemmer replied to this demand, "I am here under the orders of the President of the United States and by direction of the general-in-chief of the army, and I recognize no right of any governor to demand the surrender of U.S. property—a governor is nobody here. My orders are explicit."[1]

Military commissioners, apparently surprised at this oppositiob to their plans, withdrew. The next few days were spent in strenghhening the defenses of the fort. Slemmer expected to be attacked at any time.

On January 15, Col. Wm. H. Chase, ex-U.S. army, now in command of the military forces of the state of Florida, Accompanied by Farrand, arrived and demended to speak to Slemmer. He met them outside the fort.

"I have come on business that may occupy some time,and, if you have no objections," said Chase," we had better go inside your quarters."

"I have objections, and it would hardly be expected that I would take You into the fort."

Chase stared at hin before replying. "As I built this fort and know all its weak and strong points, I would learn nothing new by going in, and had no such object in propgoing it."

"I understand that perfectly,"said Slemmer, "but it would be improper for me to take you in, and however well you may have known the fort before, you do not know what it now contains or what I have done inside."[2]

Chase agreed, and urged Slemmer to avoid bloodshed without sacrificing his own honor by considering their formal demend for the surender of the fort.

"Colonel, how many men have you?" Slemmer asked.

"Tonight I shall have eight or nine hundred."

"Do you imagine you could take htis fort withthat number?"

"I certainly could. I could carry it by storm. I know every inch of this fort and its condition."

"With your knowledge of the fort and of your troops, what proportion of them do you imagine would be killed in such an attack?"

"If you have made the best possible preparations,as I suppose you have, and should defend it as I presume you would, I might lose half my men."

"At least," agreed Slemmer,"and I don't believe you are prepared to sacrifice that many men for such a purpose."[3]

Slemmer agreed to give the demand due consideration. After first consulting with the captains of the two ships, Slemmer positively refused to surrender the fort. Two days later a second note from Chase arrived urging surrender. The next day Slemmer replied he had no reason to change his original order. On January 24, Chase sent the mail to the occupants of Fort Pickens in answer to a plea from Slemmer. Chase apologized for the delay, and stated that that in the future mail would be delivered immediately and that fresh food would be delivered if needed. He also stated that strict orders had been given that no soldiers of civilians from this day on were to cross between the mainland and Santa Rosa Island. Thus Slemmer's situation now paralleled that of Anderson at Sumter. He had several advantages, however, that Sumter did not have. His fort had complete command of

...CONTINUED ON PAGE 13

Judsons HOBBY SHOP

2428 So. Federal 934-0022

— SPECIALIZING —
IN

PLASTIC MODEL AIRCRAFT
KITS — DECALS — PAINTS



SBD-5 DAUNTLESS

COMPLETE LINE OF KITS BY

MONOGRAM	U.P.C.	LINDBERG
AIR-LINES	HAWK	RENWAL
AURORA	AIRFIX	REVELL

— PLUS —

DECALS BY

HIS-AIR-DEC MAX ABT

AND ALWAYS A COMPLETE STOCK
OF
'PROFILES'

FIREARMS OF THE "CUSTER BATTLE"

by J.C. MacLachlin

PART II

On the other side of the fight, the arms carried are extremely poorly known. There were an estimated 8000 Indians in the encampment (some estimates are higher) with about 2500 of them being the fighting force. One estimate places the Indian arms as about half guns and half bows and lances. Of the guns, probably half, or less, were relatively modern, the rest muzzle-loaders. When it is remembered that the Army adopted the "Trap-door" action in 1866, and the caliber of .45-70 in 1873; and that the Indian supply of this type arm was solely by capture, it is apparent that they could not have had a large number of these guns. The only other comparable weapons in general use at the time were the Sharps and the Spencer carbines and rifles left over from the Civil War. The Winchester, Model 1866, was available, but expensive, and took a variety of fixed ammunition that the Indians had to rely on traders to secure. Most of the Indians prefered to use a muzzle-loader because of the ammunition supply problem. In spite of the obstacles, some of the force which overwhelmed Custer did have the repeating rifles, both Spencers and Winchesters. One rifle which could have been used by the Indians, but which seems to have been notable by its absence, was the Winchester Model 1873-an improved version of the Model 1866. It may be that the lack of this gun in the hands of the Indians two to three years after its introduction is a reflection of the changing policy of trade. Prohibition of weapons trading was instituted when it became apparent that not all the Indians getting guns were friendly in 1868 generally or earlier in some areas. A Cheyenne warrior, in an interview years later, is quoted as estimating the quantity of good guns very low, and the ammunition for them as very scarce. He remembered only 2 repeating rifles among the Cheyennes, along with less than a dozen captured guns some of which were revolvers. Even at this date (1876) the common practice among most Indians was to keep the firearms in reserve-for war-and use the bow for hunting-a reflection of the scarcity of both weapons and ammunition for them.

In any case, it is safe to assume that any gun which was in use before the date of the battle, and which had reached the western frontier, could have been in the hands of one Indian or another. This makes the list of types quite varied, restricted only by the date of manufacture and the distribution. One common characteristic of the Indian-owned weapons was lack of care. Practically every weapon turned in following defeat and capture of the various tribes was in what the Army considered "unserviceable" condition. A table of arms surrendered in 1877 by "certain bands of Sioux and Cheyennes who did not join Sitting Bull in flight across the Canadian border." (Parsons and duMont, p.33) is representative of the types in use, although lacking in specimens of the better grade of weapon (which many Indians managed to conceal for a time). It included : 124 breachloaders, 160 muzzle-loaders, 123 revolvers and 3 pistols. Nineteen of the breachloaders

were .45 Springfield carbines, 16 were early .50 caliber Springfield carbines and 12 were later models in the same caliber, 2 were .58 caliber (converted Civil War weapons). Repeaters included : 16 Henry and Winchester carbines and rifles, 23 Spencer carbines in three calibers, 13 Sharps in .50, .52, and .54 calibers, and 21 miscellaneous "war-surplus" carbines by 9 makers. The 164 muzzle-loaders were dominantly the percussion "trade rifle" with a few admixed smooth-bore muskets, some of British origin and one a flintlock.

To identify a weapon today as having had Indian use is not easy. Some "Mountain men" (fur trappers) took to the Indian ways and used the same motifs in decorating their weapons. Later day enthusiasts have created "Indian guns " by decoration in the same style and any worn-out gun could pass for an Indian gun. To place the weapon at the Custer battle is even more nearly impossible. The few guns which have a probable association are well known, and are in museums or private collections. For the rest it is only possible to accept the statistical approach, and assume that the cross-section afforded by the information we do have indicates the probable armament of the Indians that defeated Custer.

The common arm of the troopers of the 7th Cavalry, as noted above, was the Model 1873 Springfield carbine in .45-70 caliber. This gun evolved from the .50 caliber arm, which, in turn, was the descendant of the Civil War musket and the carbines of the same war. By 1865 the Army was convinced that a breachloading rifle (and carbine) was needed in service. The war delayed experimentation in the rifle, but for the mounted troops a great variety of breachloading systems had been available. Trials were held in 1865 to select the best system for standardization. Sixty-five different arms were submitted (a whole field of collecting in itself !), many of which quickly failed in the tests. By the Spring of 1866 the list had been reduced to 5, and 50 each of these were made for field trials. The 5 survivors were Allin, Peabody, Laidley, Remington, and Sharps. The Berdan, Yates, and Roberts systems had been approved by the examining board, but the report of the Secretary of War substituted the Peabody, Laidley and Sharps for them. In hind-sight it is easy to see that the Remington, Sharps and Peabody were better than the Allin, and that the Laidley (by Col. Laidley, U.S.A.) was a copy of, and equal to, the Remington. However, political considerations and practical necessity led to the adoption of the Allin system. By choosing this one over the others, the Ordnance Department was able to convert the standard Civil War muzzle-loader to a breachloader with the least loss of parts and the least addition of new parts. It was simply the insertion of a "trap-door" in the rear of the barrel, which, by tilting up and forward, gave access to the rear of the bore. The old lock, stock and barrel were retained. (In spite of our rejection of it, the Remington system was adopted by most of the other nations of the world. Until the advent of the Mauser system bolt action rifle, it was the most common military rifle in the world.)

First weapons produced on the Allin system were, of course, the .58 caliber of the Civil War guns. In 1868 this was reduced to .50, and, after trials in 1872, reduced to .45-the one we are most interested in here. The "trap-door" Allin remained the standard arm in rifle and carbine form for the U.S. Army until 1892, and continued as a Militia, or secondary,arm through the end of the century. In many units of the "home guard" equivalent of 1917-1918 it was still the basic arm, and for years after that it became the "standard" of the color guards of the American Legion. Many modifications in detail were made during the life of the arm, but none altered the basic character of the weapon. A few variatuions of special interest were made, one of which was issued to General Custer, but not carried into the final battle. These were the "Officer's Model" - sporting type modification, with some engraving, and fancier finish. Not many were produced, and they are a premium collector's item today.

The criticism leveled at the Allin system was not entirely justified. The truly major flaw of it was the slow rate of fire- it being a single-shot weapon in a period when magazine arms were rapidly coming into use in other armies of the world. The characteristic commonly associated with it of having cartridges rupture in the chamber, necessitating some special procedure for removal, was more appropriately the fault of the material of the case of the cartridge : soft copper. Yet, the critics never seemed to differentiate between the two, and when Custer was over-run the hue and cry that followed largely blamed the defeat on the gun. Some of Custer's trouble did stem from the stoppage of the guns by cartridges in the chamber of the carbines- as witness the fair number of broken cases reported from the field-but other factors played as great- or greater - a part in the event.(..number of Indians, loss of the pack animals, poor judgement, or poor advance intelligence, to cite a few)

Some figures pertinent to the carbine will be given in a table to follow, but one final comment on the weapon is in order : no sabers were carried by the Cavalry. This arm had been found to be more of an encumbrance than an aid in the type of combat engaged in, so it had been abandoned. In addition for this campaign Custer left behind a pair of Gatling guns, to retain mobility. They were less than 8 miles away on the day following the fight. One wonders what the story might have been had the pair been on the hill with the 7th when the Indian encampment was first sighted. Two "machine guns" operating in that situation would certainly have made some difference.

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Carbine, caliber .45, Model of 1873
(data from 1898 Manual, but essentially the same)

length overall.....41.3"
length of barrel...22"
rifled:3 grooves,1 turn in 22"
weight....about 8#(7.9 in manual)
half-stocked, with sling ring on bar on the left side.
implement compartment in butt only after 1879
rear sight graduated to read ranges to 1500 yds. directly
maximum range; 2800 yds.(600 effective)
rate of fire; 12 to 13 rounds per minute, average

cartridge:
case ..copper,folded head, inside primed
bullet..lead, grooved, lubricated with bayberry tallow or Japan wax
wt. 405 grains
powder...musket size, 55 grains weight
muzzle velocity: 1,150 ft. per second
penetration: 14.5" white pine at 100 yds.

Accuracy (diameter of shot group)		Angle of Elevation
range 100 yards	3.4"	22° 32"
" 200 "	8.4"	31° 23"
" 300 "	13"	43° 15"
" 500 "	23.4"	1 18° 36"
" 700 "	38"	2 03° 23"
" 1000 "	52"	3 19° 53"
" 1300 "	not given	5 07° 47"

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MEMBER PROFILE

MIKE KUHLS

The new club Historian is Mike Kuhls. Only 21 years old, he is looking forward to assemulation into the Armed Forces and feels that he might consider making the military a career. Mike is presently employed at the North Denver Bank as a tellrt. He graduated from Regis College last June (1966) with a degree in Mathematics and attended Graduate School at Colorado University for one semester.

Born in St. Louis, Mike also lived in New Orleans for a while before coming to Denver with his family seven years ago. Besides his interest in military history, he also likes the outdoors, listing mountain climbing and skiing as other hobbies.

His interests are primarily the writing of wargame rules and the immense research and reading necessary to gain the required authenticity. Mike contributed significantly to the to the modern Solomons Islands war game currently underway and also to the musket period land games rules currently in vogue among most members of the club.

He feels that the Club must become more active in order to gain and hold new members, by offering a more varied program and engaging in a wider range of activities.

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Donations to the Library- July 67

Soldier Life by Philip Van Doren Stern (PB 383 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of member Richard Moore

Indian Wars of the U.S. Army by Fairfax Downey (PB 195 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of member Richard Moore

Ignorant Armies by E.M. Halliday (PB292 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of member Raymond Freelove

Churchill by Lord Moran (HB 848 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of Robert Jones

Of Spies and Strategems by Stanley Lovell (PB 229 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of Robert Jones

Most Dangerous Sea by Arnold Lott (PB 218 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of member Thomas Herman

Pictorial History of the Second World War Wm. Wise & Co.
Volumes 2,3,4,6,7, (HB each about 300 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of Robert Jones

America, Its History and People by Harold Faulkner & Tyler Kepner
Formerly in the possession of MaryAnn Kuhls (PB 881 pp.)

Donations to the Library JULY 67 continued

But Not in Shame by John Toland (PB 450 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of member Richard Moore

Night Drop by S.L.A. Marshall (PB 327 pp.)
Formerly in the possession of member Richard Moore

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Historian's Scuttlebutt

The auction will be held at the Regular Meeting in September. Be sure to bring enough money, all proceeds go to the club. If you would like to donate something to this fund-raising, either bring it to the meeting or give it to the Historian between now and then. He is in charge of all items in the auction. So far these are the items we have: A 54mm Civil War soldier, a 54mm Revolutionary War Soldier and about 25 unpainted 30mm military miniatures of mixed types.

At the next Executive Council meeting there will be an intensive study made of the newly proposed Constitution. If you have any ideas,thoughts,doubts or comments which you think should be discussed, please come to the meeting and express ypur views. The meetings are held at President Austin Moore's house, 2952 West Layton. For directions call 794-6096. The schedule for meetings for the rest of the summer is as follows : July 24, August 28, and September 25. Remember all members are invited to attend. Come and tell us what you want; none of us are mind readers.

As stated in the minutes, the Vice-President and the Historian are looking for people to do a little work. If you are interested in giving a program contact Jim MacLachlin, 936-0931. If you would like to see something of yours in print contact Mike Kuhls, 936-4577. Both of us need help desperately in order to make plans for the future. Remember, October is 1812 month.

A Membership Committee was formed at the last Executive Council meeting. President Austin Moore appointed Richard Moore as Chairman. If you would be interested in giving Dick a hand call 798-6575.

The only good Library is one with Books in it. Search through your personal libraries and find those duplicates that you don't need anymore. You could give another book, couldn't you?

Ray Freelove informs me that he has almost completed the first batch of pins. These are made from a mold which was itself made by Bill Greer. Ray is molding, cleaning and painting them. Distribution policy will be explained either in the next Newsletter or at the next meeting.

CUSTER'S LAST STAND IN PENTAGONESE (CIRCA 1966)

by Robert Jones

Little Big Horn, Dakotas-June,1876 (UPI)
It has been reported that the Sioux guerilla forces, in their Zone "D" stronghold near the Black Hills, have inflicted light to very moderate losses upon a U.S. Cavalry force under Col. G.A. Custer. The cavalry unit,"Big Seven B", was out on a search and destroy mission called Operation Quell the Savages when they were trapped and surrounded by a large Sioux force of battalion size. Though Col. Custer was not immediately available, the mission was referred to as moderately successful by U.S. Army sources. It is not believed that any prisoners were taken by Col. Custer's force.

Dakota Territory, Fort Kearny-June,1876 (AP)
Extreme heroism was shown today by American forces under Maj.Reno in Operation Quell the Savages. Maj. Reno's cavalry group took possession of a Sioux base camp some four miles from the site of the Custer engagement. In retaliation for the "Very Moderate" losses of Col. Custer's force on the day previous, all tepees were burned and items of military value such as buffaloe hides and quivers were confiscated. The Americans were attempting to pacify the villagers who claimed they were Cherokee and not harbouring Sioux. Maj. Reno was heard to remark that it was very difficult to tell good Indians from bad Indians.

Washington, D.C. - July,1876 (UPI)
President U.S. Grant appealed to the leaders of the Sioux peoples to lay down their arms and negotiate a settlement on the final division of South Dakota. He would not, however, give any assurances that the Sioux would have any voice in the creation of the New Territories. The Sioux, of course, have been holding that the Treaty of 1871 was still valid.

Washington, D.C. - August, 1966 (UPI)
Informed sources in Washington are now observing that Col. Custer's campaign on the Little Big Horn was only partially-moderately-successful in closing the Sitting Bull Trail. Col. Custer, for some reason, is still unavailable.

*****

Editor - Michael Kuhls
Asst. Ed. - Thomas Herman
Art Editor - Dan Jones
Typist - Fayetta Jones

the harbor and could be reinforced from the sea. The situation remained unchanged until April. An uneasy truce prevailed, with Slemmer maintaining the fort at complete readiness.

The expedition to reinforce Fort Pickens arrived off Santa Rosa Island on April 16. By the 17th, the garrisons total complement had swelled to 283. After the arrival of the main body of reinforcements on April 25, the total stood at 879, officers and men, with five powerful warships commanding the harbor. Simultaneously, the sailing frigate Savine inaugurated a system that would soon be thetiresome duty of many a ship. Her job was to blockade Pensacola Harbor and deny passage to southern shipping.

The arrival of reinforcements in strength on Santa Rosa Island came just days after the fall of Fort Sumter. There can be no doubt that Pensacola was the next objective after Sumter. After the surrender of Sumter, Florida officials wired Gen. Beauregard requesting any guns that he could spare for the Florida Campaign. Thus Slemmer's decisive action in concentrating his forces and maintaining control of the fort, and the government's final decision to reinforce it, demied to the south one of her most vital and valuable objectives.

1The Soldier in Our Civil War
2 The Civil War at Sea
3 " " " " "



PENSACOLA BAY
FLORIDA
1861

BONNIE BRAE HOBBY SHOP

PLASTIC MODELS BY

MONOGRAM	U.S.S.	LINDBERG
REVELL	HAWK	RENWAL
AURORA	AIRFIX	AIR-LINES
IMPACT	L.S.	HELLER

M 103
U.S. HEAVY TANK

MILITARY VEHICLES
BY
AHM - ROSKOPF

PAINTS
HUMBROL EMRIE FLOQUIL

DECALS
HIS-AIR-DEC - MAX ABT

THIS VALUABLE COUPON
IS WORTH
50¢
ON ANY $5.00 PURCHASE
AT
BONNIE BRAE
HOBBY SHOP
By MEMBERS OF CMH
CMH
1967
NEWSLETTER

The FORT

IN MORRISON COLO.



FOOD AND ATMOSPHERE OF THE OLD WEST
COMPLETE DINNERS FROM 2.98

THE PERFECT PLACE TO ENTERTAIN
FRIENDS AND FAMILY

ONE OF OUR MANY SPECIALTIES
BUFFALO STEAKS

THE FORT IS THE OFFICIAL HEADQUARTERS
OF THE COLO. MILITARY HISTORIANS

MEETINGS .. FIRST TUESDAY OF EACH MONTH ... 6:30 PM