General MacArthur, President Roosevelt, Admiral Nimitz at the Pacific Strategy Conference, July 1944.
News and Views
Message from CMH Secretary
Eric Elder

Thank you to John Owen this month for his article on the command differences between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.

Our August meeting was well attended with plenty of games. Our club convention is coming up in November. If you were thinking of running a game, please contact a Board Member with details of your game.

I was able to visit family and some tourist sites in Canada in August. I went to the Canadian War Museum and the Canada Aviation and Space Museum. I’ve been to both, but good to see what has changed. The new sites I visited were the former maximum security prison “Kingston Penitentiary” that was in service 1835 to 2013, the oldest train tunnel in Canada “the Brockville Railway Tunnel” that opened in 1860, and the Battle of the Windmill battlefield.
August
Unit of the Month
Temporarily no sponsor

Each month, at the monthly meeting, CMH members bring their latest painted figures and models to the meeting to display their latest efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMH Member</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Lambert</td>
<td>15mm</td>
<td>Battlefront</td>
<td>WW2</td>
<td>Ger PAK43s and US M12 GMCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Cygan</td>
<td>28mm</td>
<td>Perry</td>
<td>Napoleonic</td>
<td>Waterloo Diorama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Cygan</td>
<td>10mm</td>
<td>WOG</td>
<td>WW2</td>
<td>P-38, Betty, Zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Wildfong</td>
<td>15mm</td>
<td>Med Bldg</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Med Bldg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Wildfong</td>
<td>28mm</td>
<td>Med Bldg</td>
<td>Desert</td>
<td>Med Bldg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Wildfong</td>
<td>15mm</td>
<td>Old Glory</td>
<td>Napoleonic</td>
<td>Austrian ADCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Wildfong</td>
<td>15mm</td>
<td>Old Glory</td>
<td>Napoleonic</td>
<td>Russian Gen and ADCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Wildfong</td>
<td>15mm</td>
<td>Minifig</td>
<td>Napoleonic</td>
<td>Prussian Cuirass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRY SHOCKEY</td>
<td>15mm</td>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>Medieval</td>
<td>Assorted MAA and Levies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Contrast in Command

Article by CMH Member
John F. Owen

If a casual student of the Pacific Theater in WWII is asked who principally fashioned the U.S. victory, the usual reply is “General Douglas MacArthur.” This is highly incorrect on a number of levels. It does demonstrate the power of publicity and controlling the media content. The real architect of the campaign against Japan was Commander-in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz. The contrast in how the two principal theater commanders managed their respective assignments yields some instructive conclusions.

These two leaders exercised primary command for practically the entire conflict. Douglas MacArthur headed up the Southwest Pacific command, while Admiral Chester Nimitz controlled the Pacific Ocean Area command. These delineations dated from March 1942. The two men differed rather markedly in leadership and command style. Their relative accomplishments can be weighed accordingly.

MacArthur, an accomplished self-promoter, had arguably already reached the pinnacle of career success, having served as Brigadier General in the 42nd Infantry Division in World War I, been wounded in action, awarded multiple Silver Stars, and in subsequent years becoming West Point Superintendent and then Army Chief of Staff. Subsequent to that he was appointed a Field Marshal commanding the Philippine Army.

Nimitz’ rise through ranks was less spectacular but steady, serving in submarines, destroyer command, as well as Navy Headquarters assignments. His opportunity came when, following the Pearl Harbor debacle, he was selected by President Roosevelt to replace Admiral Kimmel as commander of the Pacific Fleet, over several more senior Navy admirals.

When the Pacific War erupted, a series of missteps and poor leadership by MacArthur made a bad situation worse. Most egregiously, despite several hours warning following the Pearl Harbor attack, he failed to disperse his substantial air force – perhaps the most potent U.S. asset in the Philippine Islands, permitting it to be almost completely destroyed – on the ground – by Japanese air forces. Next, he vastly overestimated the ability of the Philippine Army to contest Japanese landings on Luzon. Though he had been in command since 1935, the Philippine Army was poorly trained and equipped, partly a consequence of the Depression’s inadequate military budgets that left the U.S. Army similarly unprepared. As the situation on the ground quickly deteriorated, MacArthur prevaricated over retreating to the Bataan Peninsula in Manila Bay – the prewar agreed on strategy for holding out against superior forces. While he eventually got most of the troops there, he completely failed to move stockpiles of vital supplies from Manila to Bataan. The consequence was that by the time of Bataan’s surrender in April 1942, the surviving troops were on ½ or even ¼ rations.
Safely ensconced in Fortress Corregidor, MacArthur only once visited his embattled troops on Bataan, thus did not have to witness the survivors weakened by malnutrition and lack of medical supplies. This earned him the appellation “Dugout Doug”. With the fall of Corregidor eminent, MacArthur was ordered evacuated by the President. Roosevelt was not about to hand the Japanese a major propaganda victory of capturing a former Chief of Staff in addition to the disastrous material loss of the Philippines. Always ready with a flamboyant turn of phrase, on (barely) escaping to Australia, MacArthur made his famous vow to return to the Philippines, and presumably reconquer them.

Nimitz was handed an extremely difficult assignment, salvaging what could be saved or repaired from the Pacific Fleet and its Hawaiian base, building up his strength, and starting the process of hitting back at the aggressor. The Navy was fortunate that its precious aircraft carriers were not involved in the Pearl Harbor attack, and Nimitz took full advantage, directing hit and run raids on enemy held islands. While on Corregidor, MacArthur continually badgered Washington for a relief operation; the President and Chiefs of Staff never definitely responded. The fact was that much of the Pacific Fleet was in shambles, and undertaking such a sortie over huge distances, against a victorious opponent, risked the nucleus for a rebuilt fleet on one throw. The Philippines were only 1800 miles from Japan; 4,000 miles from Hawaii and fully 7,000 miles distant from the U.S. West Coast. Given these handicaps, prior to hostilities, the Navy had only stationed mostly obsolete ships in the Philippines proper; by March 1942, they were largely sunk save a handful of surviving vessels. Our allies the British and the Dutch, could contribute little; their forces were constantly bested by the Japanese as well.

Nimitz took a very calculated gamble on the Midway operation in June 1942, and aided by no small amount of luck, the task forces achieved a game changing victory against heavy odds. At Guadalcanal, the same, though it required a protracted effort. The Navy performed poorly in the initial battles around Guadalcanal, but Nimitz gradually improved command arrangements and worked with what limited resources he had. In the ensuing attrition warfare, the Navy was eventually able to contest Japanese reinforcement of the island and deliver needed war material to our own land and air forces.

While Nimitz and the Navy were achieving these successes, MacArthur was temporarily out of action in Australia, slowly building Army ground and air forces at the end of an extended supply line. Nonetheless, he pushed for extending his area of responsibility at Nimitz’ expense. As active campaigning in his area commenced in late 1942, he was gradually given operational control of substantial Navy amphibious forces.

The two commanders’ relations with their subordinates were markedly different. In the first major New Guinea offensive, MacArthur publicly told the onsite division commander to take the objective or “don’t come back alive!” Throughout the war, as more and more of New Guinea was taken, MacArthur reserved all accolades for himself alone, and his sycophantic chief of staff saw to it that all staff members echoed the same. Journalists who failed to strictly adhere to this were effectively banned. He thus garnered 100% of the publicity coming from his area of operations. A flag officer visiting MacArthur’s HQ during the war remarked, “He doesn’t have a staff, he has a Court.” Surrounding himself with slavish, toady, and sycophantically officers impeded free and open exchange of ideas vital to campaign planning and execution, contributing to various setbacks that occurred. His Chief of Staff, Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland, acted as resident tyrant in dealing with lower ranking officers, slavishly promoted the MacArthur cult, and was later excused such indulgences as cohabitating with a female “companion” during the active Philippine Campaign in 1944. His Intelligence chief was all too frequently dead wrong in his assessments, but as a fierce MacArthur loyalist, was retained – not only throughout the war, but later in the Korean Conflict. There, he famously told his boss that there was practically zero chance the Chinese would intervene in Korea – they were only running a bluff! MacArthur’s Air Force commander, General Kenney, provided superb aerial support, and achieved some spectacular successes, but all reports
and news stories leaving the HQ referred only to “MacArthur’s air force or “units under MacArthur’s command.”

Conversely, Nimitz sought out capable assistants, and if they basked in the limelight, he was fine with that. Nimitz would also fight for recognition for his subordinates. In the case of his primary staff codebreaker who helped divine Japanese intentions to invade Midway, Nimitz pushed for his promotion to Captain rank, though this individual was highly disdained by the Navy hierarchy. Later, with little progress at Guadalcanal, Nimitz relieved the unfortunate Vice Admiral Ghormley, one of his best friends, but did so quietly and without fanfare. The replacement selected by Nimitz, Vice Admiral William Halsey, quickly turned U.S. fortunes around.

In contrast to MacArthur, Nimitz almost eschewed publicity, though his staff suggested generating more so as to award the Navy its deserved credit. The Navy admiral most publicized back home at the time was Halsey, victor in the Guadalcanal campaign (Halsey was a good source of fiery quotes for correspondents). While Halsey’s performance later in the war turned markedly downward, these failings were attributable solely to him. Nimitz’ staff functioned at a much more even and workmanlike level, and he made an effort to rotate senior staff to combat assignments in part to enhance their career prospects.

As American forces moved closer to Japan proper, it was decision time for how the National Command Authority wished to pursue the final campaigns. This occurred in July 1944 as the two theater commanders met in Hawaii to confer with their Commander-in-Chief. MacArthur used his flair for the histrionic to upstage Nimitz and support for his course of action. As was his habit (and in a rather juvenile fashion) he also repeatedly mispronounced his counterpart’s name as “Nee-mitz” when he disagreed with the admiral. To shorten the war, the Navy had proposed invading Formosa instead of the Philippines. Possession of Formosa would more completely deprive Japan of crucial resources from Malaya and the East Indies. It would also threaten Japanese controlled territory on the Chinese mainland, and incidentally sideline MacArthur.

MacArthur demanded that he be allowed to redeem his pledge to retake the Philippines. For his part, Nimitz realized this was partly a humanitarian decision as well as a strategic one and did not vigorously contest it, though his boss, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, was a fierce Formosa partisan. Though he personally had some issues with MacArthur, President Roosevelt was first and foremost a politician. He was well aware the general had a substantial following among Republicans and others. Predictably, he decided in MacArthur’s favor. While this promised to be a more costly and protracted campaign than Formosa, it was politically necessary, as the Islands were U.S. territory and its population suffered severely under the occupiers. There was also the chance of liberating large pockets of maltreated U.S. POWs still held by the enemy on the islands.

Later events may have proved the Navy correct about Formosa. While much of the Philippines were liberated, northern Luzon remained in Japanese hands until the end of the war, and the Battle for Manila saw the city in ruins and tens of thousands of civilians massacred by the Japanese. The sad fact is that the Filipino population would have continued to suffer whether the Islands were invaded or not.

Nimitz’ Central Pacific campaign rolled forward in early 1945, taking Iwo Jima in a bloody battle. Then Okinawa, a joint Navy-Marine-Army operation, a protracted fight that became the most costly Pacific War land battle. The Navy actually sustained more fatal casualties as a result of protecting the landings than the embattled ground forces. It also cost the fleet many ships sunk and many more damaged due to the Japanese kamikaze attacks. As the summer of 1945 progressed Nimitz’ CINCPAC staff gleaned accurate assessments of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu; the island was being flooded with troops and material. When he and other naval leaders expressed concern on proceeding with the planned invasion in
October, MacArthur opined that the assessments were exaggerated. Some speculated that MacArthur’s desire to lead the largest land invasion in history overrode verified intelligence conclusions.

Fortunately, deployment of two atomic devices on Japanese cities convinced the Emperor, if not the Imperial Army, to throw in the towel (some Army officers attempted to override His Majesty’s intent, but were by a very narrow margin frustrated). MacArthur’s proclivity for cultivating publicity paid off as the war came to a close, as he was chosen to sign the Japanese surrender document for the United Nations. Appointed postwar as U.S. viceroy in Japan, MacArthur was eventually venerated by the Japanese population only somewhat less than His Majesty the Emperor. One may observe that MacArthur excelled in this civil role to a greater extent than his military one, which sadly ended in the Korean debacle, fueled by hubris and arrogance. Nimitz signed the surrender acceptance as U.S. representative. His postwar career ended on a much more positive note, finishing active service as Chief of Naval Operations until late 1947. He later served as a U.N. mediator/administrator in the dispute over Kashmir, although the volatile situation there did not admit of peaceful resolution, still unresolved to this day.
Historic Location of the Month

Battle of the Windmill

The Battle of the Windmill took place at the site of a windmill on the Canadian side of the St. Lawrence river in November 1838 between the British and the Hunter Patriot para-military group based in the United States. Today the landmark Windmill remains, but is now a lighthouse. The Hunters eventually had to surrender.
August
Game of the Month
Sponsored by Total Escape Games

Each month CMH members host games at the monthly meeting. This award is for the effort put out by the host.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMH Member</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Rules</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>JEFF LAMBERT</strong></td>
<td>15mm</td>
<td>Flames of War</td>
<td>A Shot in the Dark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mumby,</td>
<td>15mm</td>
<td>Test of Resolve</td>
<td>Lancastrian vs Yorkists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terry Shockey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greg Cornell</td>
<td>28mm</td>
<td>Field of Battle</td>
<td>WSS British vs French</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Winner in RED*
## 2021 Conventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>Gen Con</td>
<td>Indianapolis, IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>Hurricon (HMGS South)</td>
<td>Orlando, Fl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Oct 3</td>
<td>Origins</td>
<td>Columbus, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Advance the Colors (HMGS Great Lakes)</td>
<td>Springfield, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Autumn Wars</td>
<td>Bannockburn, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17</td>
<td>Borderwars</td>
<td>Kansas City, KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-24</td>
<td>Cincycon</td>
<td>Cincinnati, OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>Historicon (HMGS)</td>
<td>King of Prussia, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-14</td>
<td>MillenniumCon</td>
<td>Round Rock, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14</td>
<td>Veterans Wars</td>
<td>Denver, CO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Colorado Military Historians, Inc.

Colorado Military Historians (CMH) is a non-profit organization whose purpose is to promote historical wargaming and the study of military history. Founded in 1965, CMH meets monthly on the second Sunday of the month, except in May when the meeting is deferred to the third Sunday. The meeting starts at noon at the Baker Recreation Center, 6751 Irving Street (just a few blocks west of Federal Blvd), Denver, Colorado. The club also hosts gaming at least one Friday night a month, called “Friday Night Fights” (FNF) at 7:00 p.m. Friday meetings will be held at a future determined location. See website for latest information.

CMH maintains ties with numerous local, regional, and national groups to help promote the hobby. CMH is governed by member-elected officers serving on the Board of Directors (executive board). Terms of office are one year, with elections held at the May meeting. New members are accepted after attending three CMH functions and a vote of the membership. Dues are $50.00 per year, payable in January. Members wishing to receive a snail-mailed newsletter subscription must pay an additional fee of $15.00 per year. Authors retain ownership of articles and graphics published. CMH reserves the right to edit or reject submissions to the newsletter.

One year Adult Membership: $50.00 ($30 for those that paid $50 for 2020)
Half year Adult Membership: $25.00
(For NEW members who join after June 30)
Family Membership: $50.00 (one Adult and any number of offspring)
Student Membership: $25.00 (16 to 22 years old)
Children: free (younger than 16 accompanied by member)

Club Links:
Web Site: https://cmhweb.org/
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/cmhgamers/
Groups.io Group: https://groups.io/g/cmhweb
Discord: https://discord.gg/DAP2Gn

CMH Newsletter

The CMH Newsletter is a monthly newsletter published by the Colorado Military Historians. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of all CMH members.

Mailing Address:
Eric Elder
9529 Castle Ridge Cir.
Highlands Ranch, CO 80129

Phone: 303-933-4723
Email: egquist@hotmail.com
Editor/Layout: Eric Elder
Next Issue: October 2021

2021/2022 CMH Board Members

President:
Nate Forte
natforteg1@gmail.com

Vice-President
Jim Raidon
raidon8071@comcast.net

Secretary
Eric Elder
egquist@hotmail.com

Treasurer
Larry Irons

Historian
Doug Wildfong
dwwild84@gmail.com